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Comparison of Nitze and CIA Figures

1. NB: CIA has not maintained an OB on any serial basis as MACV does. We have constructed our own OB as of 30 January 1968 (see attachment) which we are now negotiating with DIA. With this caveat the CIA figures given below are a retroactive adjustment of our 30 January 1968 figures to accord with Mr. Nitze's end-1967 figures as reported in his answer to Question #1.

	Nitze	CIA
Main and Local Forces	110,400	135,000
NVA*	(51,600)	(59,000)
VC	(58,800)	(76,000)
Administrative Services	37,700	75-120,000
Guerrillas	71,700	100-120,000
Sub-Total	219,800	310-375,000

*Does not include estimated 10,000 NVA troops attached to VC units.

2. Mr. Nitze's statement of "confirmed enemy strength" excludes two categories that CIA feels should be included in estimates of enemy strengths. These are Political Cadre and Self-defense Forces and are discussed in Mr. Nitze's answer to Question 3:

	Nitze	CIA
Political Cadre	75-85,000	80-120,000
Self-defense	Unquantified as not being "fighting forces"	100,000

3. In Question 5 and Question 10 Mr. Nitze characterizes the enemy's net losses as 2,000-4,000 monthly in 1967. CIA has not felt that adequate data are available to quantify the enemy's net losses.

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ATTACHMENT

Comparison of MACV and CIA OB Holdings As of 30 January 1968

	MACV*	CIA
Main and Local Forces	115,000	160,000
NVA	(55,600)	(100,000)
VC	(59,400)	(60,000)
Administrative Services	37,700	75-120,000
Guerrillas	72,600	100-120,000
Sub-Total	225,300	335-360,000
Self Defense	Unquantified	100,000
Political Cadre	84,000	80-120,000
	309,300	515-600,000

* This OB was adjusted by MACV on 29 February to raise Main and Local Forces to 127,300 and sub-total to 232,200 (including an adjustment for 5,400 KIA not identified by element).

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